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Abstract Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-anonymous review-
ing? I consider two arguments in favor. The first says that insofar as editors’
decisions are affected by information they would not have had under triple-
anonymous review, an injustice is committed against certain authors. I show that
even well-meaning editors would commit this wrong and I endorse this argument.
The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by infor-
mation they would not have had under triple-anonymous review, it will negatively
affect the quality of published papers. I distinguish between two kinds of biases that
an editor might have. I show that one of them has a positive effect on quality and the
other a negative one, and that the combined effect could be either positive or
negative. Thus I do not endorse the second argument in general. However, I do
endorse this argument for certain fields, for which I argue that the positive effect
does not apply.
Keywords Feminist philosophy of science  Bias  Peer review  Social
epistemology  Formal epistemology
1 Introduction
Journal editors occupy an important position in the scientific landscape. By making
the final decision on which papers get published in their journal and which papers do
not, they have a significant influence on what work is given attention and what work
is ignored in their field (Crane 1967).
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In this paper I investigate the following question: should the editor be informed
about the identity of the author when she is deciding whether to publish a particular
paper? Under a single- or double-anonymous reviewing procedure, the editor knows
who the author of each submitted paper is.1 Under a triple-anonymous reviewing
procedure, the author’s name and affiliation are hidden from the editor unless and
until the paper is accepted for publication. So the question is: should journals
practice triple-anonymous reviewing?2
Two kinds of arguments have been given in favor of triple-anonymous reviewing.
One focuses on the treatment of the author by the editor. On this kind of argument,
revealing identity information to the editor will lead the editor to (partially) base her
judgment on irrelevant information. This is unfair to the author, and is thus bad.
The second kind of argument highlights the effect on the journal and its readers.
Again, the idea is that the editor will base her judgment on identity information if
given the chance to do so. But now the further claim is that as a result the journal
will accept worse papers. After all, if a decision to accept or reject a paper is
influenced by the editor’s biases, this suggests that a departure has been made from
a putative ‘‘objectively correct’’ decision. This harms the readers of the journal, and
is thus bad.3
This paper assesses these arguments. I distinguish between two different ways the
editor’s judgment may be affected if the author’s identity is revealed to her. First,
the editor may treat authors she knows differently from authors she does not know, a
phenomenon I will call connection bias. Second, the editor may treat authors
differently based on some aspect of their identity (e.g., their gender), which I will
call identity bias. I make the following three claims.
My first claim is that connection bias actually benefits rather than harms the
readers of the journal. This benefit is the result of a reduction in editorial uncertainty
about the quality of submitted papers. I construct a model to show in a formally
precise way how such a benefit might arise—surprisingly, no assumption that the
scientists the editor knows are ‘‘better scientists’’ is required—and I cite empirical
evidence that such a benefit indeed does arise. However, this benefit only applies in
certain fields; I argue that mathematics and parts of the humanities are excluded
(Sect. 2).
My second claim is that whenever connection bias or identity bias affects an
editorial decision, this constitutes an epistemic injustice in the sense of Fricker
(2007) against the disadvantaged author. If the editor is to be (epistemically) just,
she should prevent these biases from operating, which can be done through triple-
1 The difference is that under a single-anonymous procedure any reviewers who advise on the
publishability of the paper are informed about the identity of the author, whereas under a double-
anonymous procedure the reviewers are not told who the author is. The identity of the reviewers is kept
hidden from the author regardless of whether a single-, double-, or triple-anonymous procedure is used.
2 The relevant procedures are often called single-, double-, and triple-blind reviewing. I avoid this
terminology as it has been criticized for being ableist (Tremain 2017, introduction).
3 Hence, I distinguish between the effects of triple-anonymous reviewing on the author and on the
readers of the journal. This reflects a growing understanding that in order to study the social epistemology
of science, what is good for an individual inquirer must be distinguished from what is good for the wider
scientific community (Kitcher 1993; Strevens 2003; Mayo-Wilson et al. 2011).
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anonymous reviewing. So I endorse an argument of the first of the two kinds I
identified above: triple-anonymous reviewing is preferable because not doing so is
unfair to authors (Sects. 3, 4).
My third claim is that whether editorial biases harm the journal and its readers
depends on a number of factors. Connection bias benefits readers, whereas identity
bias harms them. Whether there is an overall benefit or harm depends on the
strength of the editor’s identity bias, the relative sizes of the different groups, and
other factors, as I illustrate using the model. As a result I do not in general endorse
the second kind of argument, that triple-anonymous reviewing is preferable because
readers of the journal are harmed otherwise. However, I do endorse this argument
for fields like mathematics, where I claim that the benefits of connection bias do not
apply (Sect. 5).
Zollman (2009) has studied the effects of different editorial policies on the
number of papers published and the selection criteria for publication, but he does
not focus specifically on the editor’s decisions. Economists have studied models in
which editorial decisions play an important role (Ellison 2002; Faria 2005;
Besancenot et al. 2012), but they have not been concerned with biases the editor
may be subject to. Other economists have done empirical work investigating the
differences between papers with and without an author-editor connection (Laband
and Piette 1994; Medoff 2003; Smith and Dombrowski 1998, more on this later),
but they do not provide a model that can explain these differences. This paper thus
fills a gap in the literature.
I compare double- and triple-anonymous reviewing as opposed to single- and
double-anonymous reviewing. The latter comparison has been studied extensively,
see Blank (1991) for a prominent empirical study and Snodgrass (2006) and Lee
et al. (2013, especially pp. 10–11) for literature reviews. In contrast, I know of
almost no empirical or theoretical work directly comparing double- and triple-
anonymous reviewing (one exception is Lee and Schunn 2010, p. 7).
While I focus on comparing double- and triple-anonymous review, some of what
I say may carry over to the context of comparing single- and double-anonymous
review. In Sect. 5 I comment briefly on the extent to which the formal model I
present applies in the context of comparing single- and double-anonymous review.
However, I leave it to the reader to judge to what extent the arguments I make on the
basis of the model carry over.
2 A model of connection bias
As mentioned, journal editors have a certain measure of power in a scientific
community because they decide which papers get published.4 An editor could use
this power to the benefit of her friends or colleagues, or to promote certain subfields
4 Different journals may have different policies, such as one in which associate editors make the final
decision for papers in their (sub)field. Here, I simply define ‘‘the editor’’ to be whomever makes the final
decision whether to publish a particular paper.
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or methodologies over others. This phenomenon has been called editorial
favoritism.
Bailey et al. (2008a, b) find that academics believe editorial favoritism to be
fairly prevalent, with a nonnegligible percentage claiming to have perceived it
firsthand. Hull (1988, chapter 9) finds a limited degree of favoritism in his study of
reviewing practices at the journal Systematic Zoology. And Laband (1985) and
Piette and Ross (1992) find that papers whose author has a connection to the journal
editor are allocated more journal pages than papers by authors without such a
connection.5
In this paper, I refer to the phenomenon that editors are more likely to accept
papers from authors they know than papers from authors they do not know as
connection bias.
Academics tend to disapprove of this behavior (Sherrell et al. 1989; Bailey et al.
2008a, b). In both studies by Bailey et al., in which subjects were asked to rate the
seriousness of various potentially problematic behaviors by editors and reviewers,
this disapproval was shown to be part of a general and strong disapproval of ‘‘selfish
or cliquish acts’’ in the peer review process.6 Thus it appears that the reason
academics disapprove of connection bias is that it shows the editor acting on private
interests, whereas disinterestedness is the norm in science (Merton 1942).
On the other hand, there is some evidence that connection bias improves the
overall quality of accepted papers (Laband and Piette 1994; Medoff 2003; Smith
and Dombrowski 1998). Does this mean scientists are misguided in their
disapproval?
In this section, I use a formal model to show that editors may display connection
bias even if their only goal is to accept the best papers, and that this may improve
quality, consistent with Laband and Piette’s, Medoff’s, and Smith and Dom-
browski’s findings. Note that in this section I discuss connection bias only.
Subsequent sections discuss identity bias.
Consider a simplified scientific community. Each scientist produces a paper and
submits it to the community’s only journal which has one editor. Some papers are
more suitable for publication than others. I assume that this suitability can be
measured on a single numerical scale. For convenience I call this the quality of the
paper. However, I remain neutral on how this notion should be interpreted, e.g., as
an objective measure of the epistemic value of the paper, or as the number of times
the paper would be cited in future papers if it was published, or as the average
5 Here, page allocation is used as a proxy for journal editors’ willingness to push the paper. The more
obvious variable to use here would be whether or not the paper is accepted for publication. Unfortunately,
there are no empirical studies which measure the influence of author-editor relationships on acceptance
decisions directly. Presumably this is because information about rejected papers is usually not available.
6 This evidence conflicts to some extent with other survey findings. If connection bias was a serious
worry for working scientists, one would expect them to rank knowing the editor and the composition of
the editorial board more generally among the most important factors in deciding where to submit their
papers. But Ziobrowski and Gibler (2000) find that this is not the case (these factors are ranked twelfth
and sixteenth in a list of sixteen potentially relevant factors in their survey). In a similar survey by Mackie
(1998, chapter 4), twenty percent of authors indicated that knowing the editor and/or her preferences is an
important consideration in deciding where to submit a paper.
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subjective value each member of the scientific community would assign to it if they
read it.7
Crucially, the editor does not know the quality of the paper at the time it is
submitted. This section aims to show how uncertainty about quality can lead to
connection bias. To make this point, I assume that the editor cares only about
quality, i.e., she makes an estimate of the quality of a paper and publishes those and
only those papers whose quality estimate is high.
Let qi be the quality of the paper submitted by scientist i. qi is modeled as a
random variable to reflect uncertainty about quality. Since some scientists are more
likely to produce high quality papers than others, the mean li of this random
variable may be different for each scientist. I assume that quality follows a normal
distribution with fixed variance: qi j liNðli; r2inÞ (read: ‘‘qi given li follows a
normal distribution with mean li and variance r
2
in’’; the subscript in indicates that
this is the variance in the quality of individual papers by the same author).
The assumptions of normality and fixed variance are made primarily to keep the
mathematics simple. Below I make similar assumptions on the distribution of
average quality in the scientific community and the distribution of reviewers’
estimates of the quality of a paper. The results below likely hold under many
different distributional assumptions.8
If the editor knows scientist i, she has some prior information on the average
quality of scientist i’s work. This is reflected in the model by assuming that the
editor knows the value of li. In contrast, the editor is uncertain about the average
quality of the work of scientists she does not know. All she knows is the distribution
of average quality in the larger scientific community, which I also assume to be
normal: liNðl; r2scÞ.
Note that I assume the scientific community to be homogeneous: average paper
quality follows the same distribution in the two groups of scientists (those known to
the editor and those not known to the editor). If I assumed instead that scientists
known to the editor write better papers on average the results would be qualitatively
similar to those I present below. If scientists known to the editor write worse papers
on average this would affect my results. However, since most journal editors are
relatively central figures in their field (Crane 1967), this seems implausible for most
cases.
The editor’s prior for the quality of a paper submitted by some scientist i reflects
this difference in information. If she knows the scientist she knows the value of li,
and so her prior is pðqi j liÞNðli; r2inÞ. If the editor does not know scientist i she
is uncertain about li. Integrating out this uncertainty yields a prior
pðqiÞNðl; r2in þ r2scÞ for the quality of scientist i’s paper.
When the editor receives a paper she sends it out for review. The reviewer
provides an estimate ri of the paper’s quality which is again a random variable. I
assume that the reviewer’s report is unbiased, i.e., its mean is the actual quality qi of
7 See Bright (2017) for more on potential difficulties with the notion of quality.
8 This claim is made precise and proved in Heesen and Romeijn (2017).
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the paper. Once again I use a normal distribution to reflect uncertainty:
ri j qiNðqi; r2rvÞ.9
The editor uses the information from the reviewer’s report to update her beliefs. I
assume that she does this by conditioning on ri. Thus, her posterior for the quality of
scientist i’s paper is pðqi j riÞ if she does not know the author, and pðqi j ri; liÞ if she
does.
The posterior distributions are themselves normal distributions whose mean is a
weighted average of ri and the prior mean (see Proposition 5 in ‘‘Appendix’’). I
write lUi for the mean of the posterior distribution if the editor does not know
scientist i and lKi if she does.
I assume that the editor publishes any paper whose (posterior) expected quality is
above some threshold q. So a paper written by a scientist unknown to the editor is
published if lUi [ q
 and a paper written by a scientist known to the editor is
published if lKi [ q
. Other standards could be used: risk-averse standards might
require high (greater than 50%) confidence that the paper is above some threshold.
For the qualitative results presented here this makes no difference (see Proposition 7
in the Appendix).
The first theorem establishes the existence of connection bias in the model (refer
to the Appendix for all proofs). It says that the editor is more likely to publish a
paper written by an arbitrary author she knows than a paper written by an arbitrary
author she does not know, whenever q[ l (for any positive value of r2sc and r
2
rv).
The condition amounts to a requirement that the journal’s acceptance rate is less
than 50%. This is true of most reputable journals in most fields (physics being a
notable exception).
Theorem 1 (Connection Bias) If q[ l, r2sc[ 0, and r
2
rv[ 0, the acceptance
probability for authors known to the editor is higher than the acceptance probability
for authors unknown to the editor, i.e., PrðlKi [ qÞ[ PrðlUi [ qÞ:
Theorem 1 shows that in my model any journal with an acceptance rate lower
than 50% will be seen to display connection bias. Thus I have established the
surprising result that an editor who cares only about the quality of the papers she
publishes may end up publishing more papers by her friends and colleagues than by
scientists unknown to her, even if her friends and colleagues are not, as a group,
better scientists than average.10
9 The reviewer’s report could reflect the opinion of a single reviewer, or the averaged opinion of multiple
reviewers. The editor could even act as a reviewer herself, in which case the report reflects her findings
which she has to incorporate in her overall beliefs about the quality of the paper. The assumption I make
in the text covers these scenarios, as long as a given journal is fairly consistent in the number of reviewers
used. Some journals may use different numbers of reviewers for different papers (potentially affecting the
variance if more reviewers give more accurate information than fewer) or employ reviewers in different
roles (e.g., one reviewer to assess technical aspects of the paper and one reviewer to assess non-technical
aspects). My model does not apply to journals where these differences correlate with the existence or
absence of a connection between editor and author.
10 The model presented in this section is formally similar to that of Miller (1994) and Borsboom et al.
(2008). They assume genuine differences in average quality between groups, so a result like Theorem 1 is
true but unsurprising in their models.
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Why does this surprising result hold? The distribution of the posterior mean lUi
has lower variance than the distribution of lKi (see Proposition 6 in the Appendix).
That is, the variance of lUi is lower in an ‘‘objective’’ sense: this is not a claim about
the editor’s subjective uncertainty about her judgment. This is because lUi is a
weighted average of l and ri, keeping it relatively close to the overall mean l
compared to lKi , which is a weighted average of li and ri (which tend to differ
from l in the same direction).
Note that the result assumes that scientists known to the editor and scientists
unknown to the editor are held to the same ‘‘standard’’ (the threshold q).
Alternatively, the editor might enforce equal acceptance rates for the two groups.
This would be formally equivalent to raising the threshold for known scientists (or
lowering the threshold for unknown scientists).
Theorem 1 describes a subjective effect: an editor who uses information about
the average quality of papers produced by scientists she knows will believe that
scientists she knows produce on average more papers that meet her quality
threshold. Does this translate into an objective effect?
In order to answer this question I compare the average quality of accepted papers,
or more formally, the expected value of the quality of a paper, conditional on
meeting the publication threshold, given that the author is either known to the editor
or not.
Theorem 2 (Positive Effect of Connection Bias) If r2sc[ 0, and r
2
rv[ 0, the
average quality of accepted papers from authors known to the editor is higher than
the average quality of accepted papers from authors unknown to the editor, i.e.,
E½qi j lKi [ q[ E½qi j lUi [ q.
The editor’s knowledge of the average quality of papers written by scientists she
knows makes it such that among those scientists relatively many whose papers are
accepted have relatively high average quality. Since this correlates with paper
quality the average quality of accepted papers in this group is relatively high,
yielding Theorem 2.
The theorem shows that the editor can use the extra information she has about
scientists she knows to improve the average quality of the papers published in her
journal. The surprising result, then, is that the editor’s connection bias actually
benefits rather than harms the readers of the journal. In other words, the editor can
use her connections to ‘‘identify and capture high-quality papers’’, as Laband and
Piette (1994) suggest.
To what extent does this show that the connection bias observed in reality is the
result of editors capturing high-quality papers, as opposed to editors using their
position of power to help their friends? At this point the model yields an empirical
prediction. If connection bias is (primarily) due to capturing high-quality papers, the
quality of papers by authors the editor knows should be higher than average, as
shown in the model. If, on the other hand, connection bias is (primarily) a result of
the editor accepting for publication papers written by authors she knows even
though they do not meet the quality standards of the journal, then the quality of
papers by authors the editor knows should be lower than average.
When journal editors play favorites 837
123
If subsequent citations are a good indication of the quality11 of a paper, a simple
regression can test whether accepted papers written by authors with an author-editor
connection have higher or lower average quality than papers without such a
connection. This empirical test has been carried out a number of times, and the
results favor the hypothesis that editors use their connections to improve the quality
of published papers (Laband and Piette 1994; Smith and Dombrowski 1998; Medoff
2003).12
Note that in the above (qualitative) results, nothing depends on the sizes of the
variances r2in, r
2
sc, and r
2
rv. The values of the variances do matter when the
acceptance rate and average quality of papers are compared quantitatively. For
example, reducing r2rv (making the reviewer’s report more accurate) reduces the
differences in the acceptance rate and average quality of papers.
Note also that the results depend on the assumption that r2sc and r
2
rv are positive.
What is the significance of these assumptions?
If r2rv ¼ 0, i.e., if there is no variance in the reviewer’s report, the reviewer
reports the quality of the paper with perfect accuracy. In this case the ‘‘extra
information’’ the editor has about authors she knows is not needed, and so there is
no difference in acceptance rate or average quality based on whether the editor
knows the author. But it seems unrealistic to expect reviewer’s reports to be this
accurate.
If r2sc ¼ 0 there is either no difference in the average quality of papers produced
by different authors, or learning the identity of the author does not tell the editor
anything about the expected quality of that scientist’s work. In this case there is no
value to the editor (with regard to determining the quality of the submitted paper) in
learning the identity of the author. So here there is also no difference in acceptance
rate or average quality based on whether the editor knows the author.
Under what circumstances should the identity of the author be expected to tell the
editor something useful about the quality of a submitted paper? This seems to be
most obviously the case in the lab sciences. The identity of the author, and hence the
lab at which the experiments were performed, can increase or decrease the editor’s
confidence that the experiments were performed correctly, including all the little
checks and details that are impossible to describe in a paper. In such cases, ‘‘ the
reader must rely on the author’s (and perhaps referee’s) testimony that the author
really performed the experiment exactly as claimed, and that it worked out as
reported’’ (Easwaran 2009, p. 359).
11 Recall that I have remained neutral on how the notion of quality should be interpreted. If quality is
simply defined as ‘‘the number of citations this paper would get if it were published’’ the connection
between quality and citations is obvious. Even on other interpretations of quality, citations have
frequently been viewed as a good proxy measure (Cole and Cole 1967, 1968; Medoff 2003). This practice
has been defended by Cole and Cole (1971) and Clark (1957, chapter 3), and criticized by Lindsey (1989)
and Heesen (forthcoming).
12 Laband and Piette and Medoff focus on economics journals and Smith and Dombrowski on accounting
journals. Further research would be valuable to see whether these results generalize, especially to the
natural sciences and the humanities. Note also that these results do not rule out the possibility that editors
use their power to help their friends: they merely suggest that on balance editors’ use of connections has a
positive effect on citations.
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But in other fields, in particular mathematics and those parts of the humanities
that focus on abstract arguments, there is no need to rely on the author’s reputation.
This is because in these fields the paper itself is the contribution, so it is possible to
judge papers in isolation of how or by whom they were created (Easwaran 2009).
And in fact there exists a norm that this is how they should be judged: ‘‘Papers will
rely only on premises that the competent reader can be assumed to antecedently
believe, and only make inferences that the competent reader would be expected to
accept on her own consideration.’’ (Easwaran 2009, p. 354).
Arguably then, the epistemic advantage conferred by revealing identity informa-
tion about the author to the editor applies only in certain fields. The relevant fields are
those where part of the information in the paper is conferred on the authority of
testimony. In mathematics and parts of the humanities, where a careful reading of a
paper itself constitutes a reproduction of its argument, there is no relevant information
to be learned from the identity of the author (i.e., r2sc ¼ 0). Or at least the publishing
norms in these fields suggest that their members believe this to be the case.
3 Connection bias as an epistemic injustice
The previous section discussed a formal model of editorial uncertainty about paper
quality. I first established the existence of connection bias in this model. Then I
showed that connection bias benefits the readers of the journal, insofar as readers
care about the quality of accepted papers. Despite this benefit to readers, I claim that
connection bias is unfair to authors. In this section I argue this claim by appealing to
the concept of epistemic injustice, as developed by Fricker (2007).
The type of epistemic justice that is relevant here is testimonial injustice. Fricker
(2007, pp. 17–23) defines a testimonial injustice as a case where a speaker suffers a
credibility deficit for which the hearer is ethically and epistemically culpable.
Testimonial injustices may arise in various ways. Fricker is particularly
interested in what she calls ‘‘the central case of testimonial injustice’’ (Fricker
2007, p. 28). This kind of injustice results from a negative identity-prejudicial
stereotype, which is defined as follows:
A widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more
attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some
(typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an
ethically bad affective investment. (Fricker 2007, p. 35)
Because the stereotype is widely held, it produces systematic testimonial
injustice: the relevant social group will suffer a credibility deficit in many different
social spheres.
It is clear that connection bias is not an instance of the central case of testimonial
injustice. This would require some negative stereotype associated with scientists
unknown to the editor (as a group) which does not normally exist. So I set the
central case aside (I return to it in Sect. 4) and focus on the question whether
connection bias can produce (non-central cases of) testimonial injustice.
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How are individual scientists affected by the differential acceptance rates
established in Sect. 2? For scientist i, the probability of acceptance given the
average quality of her papers li denotes the long-run average proportion of her
papers that will be accepted (assuming she submits all her papers to the journal).
Theorem 3 (Acceptance Rate for Individual Authors) Assume r2sc[ 0 and
r2rv[ 0 . The acceptance rate for author i (with average quality li) is higher if the
editor knows her if and only if li exceeds a weighted average of l and q
 :
Pr lKi [ q
jli
  Pr lUi [ qjli
 
iff li
r2in
r2in þ r2sc
lþ r
2
sc
r2in þ r2sc
q:
The strict version is true as well, i.e., if the editor knows scientist i she is strictly
better off if and only if li strictly exceeds the weighted average.
Note that regardless of the values of the variances, any scientist whose average
quality exceeds the threshold value (li q) benefits from connection bias.
Conversely, a scientist of below average quality (li l) is actually worse off if the
editor knows her.13
Consider what this theorem says for a particular scientist i who is unknown to the
editor and whose average quality li strictly exceeds the weighted average. Some of
her papers are rejected even though they would have been accepted if the editor
knew her. In Fricker’s terminology, scientist i suffers from a credibility deficit:
fewer of her papers are considered credible (i.e., publishable) by the editor than
would have been considered credible if the editor knew her.
Is this credibility deficit suffered by scientist i ethically and epistemically
culpable on the part of the editor? On the one hand, the editor is simply making
maximal use of the information available to her. It just so happens that she has more
information about scientists she knows than about others. But that is hardly the
editor’s fault. Is it incumbent upon her to get to know the work of every scientist
who submits a paper?
This may well be too much to ask. But an alternative option is to remove all
information about the authors of submitted papers. This can be done by using a
triple-anonymous reviewing procedure, in which the editor is prevented from using
information about scientists she knows in her evaluation.
I conclude that the editor is ethically and epistemically culpable for credibility
deficits suffered by scientists unknown to the editor whose average quality exceeds
the weighted average specified in Theorem 3, and hence testimonial injustices are
committed against such authors when a double-anonymous reviewing procedure is
used. A similar epistemic injustice occurs for scientists known to the editor whose
average quality is below the weighted average, as such authors would prefer that the
editor not use information she has about their average quality.
It is worth noting explicitly which scientists are better or worse off in terms of
acceptance rates if a triple-anonymous procedure is introduced. If the acceptance
13 These claims assume that q[l. Note also that only a minority of authors benefits from connection
bias, as half of all authors satisfy li l.
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threshold q is held constant,14 nothing changes for scientists unknown to the editor.
Scientists known to the editor will see their acceptance rate go down if their average
quality exceeds the weighted average specified in Theorem 3, and up otherwise. The
overall acceptance rate of the journal will go down (by Theorem 1).
So the group that I based my argument on (unknown scientists of high average
quality) is not necessarily made better off by switching to triple-anonymous
reviewing. The argument for triple-anonymous reviewing given in this section is not
about benefiting one group of scientists or harming another: rather, it is about
fairness. Under a triple-anonymous procedure, at least all scientists are treated
equally: any scientist who writes a paper of a given quality has the same chance of
seeing that paper accepted. Whereas under a double-anonymous procedure,
scientists are treated unfairly in that their acceptance rates may differ based only
on an epistemically irrelevant characteristic (knowing the editor).
I conclude that while journal readers may benefit from connection bias, it
involves unfair treatment of authors. Because this unfair treatment takes the form of
an epistemic injustice, which involves both ethically and epistemically culpable
behavior, connection bias has both an epistemic benefit (to readers) and a cost (to
the author). It would be a misinterpretation of my analysis, then, to conclude that
connection bias is epistemically good but ethically bad.
4 Identity bias as an epistemic injustice
So far, I have assumed that connection bias is the only bias journal editors display.
The literature on implicit bias suggests further biases: ‘‘[i]f submissions are not
anonymous to the editor, then the evidence suggests that women’s work will
probably be judged more negatively than men’s work of the same quality’’ (Saul
2013, p. 45). Evidence for this claim is given by Wennera˚s and Wold (1997),
Valian (1999, chapter 11), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Budden et al. (2008), and Moss-
Racusin et al. (2012).15 So women scientists are at a disadvantage simply because of
their gender identity. Similar biases exist based on other irrelevant aspects of
scientists’ identity, such as race or sexual orientation (see Lee et al. 2013 for a
critical survey of various biases in the peer review system). As Crandall
(1982, p. 208) puts it: ‘‘The editorial process has tended to be run as an informal,
14 Things are slightly more subtle if the overall acceptance rate of the journal is held constant instead.
The threshold will go down, say to q\q, and hence all scientists unknown to the editor will see their
acceptance rates go up, as PrðlUi [ q j liÞ[ PrðlUi [ q j liÞ for all values of li. The acceptance rate
for known scientists must correspondingly go down, but the effect on an individual known scientist i
depends on li. In particular, PrðlKi [ q j liÞ PrðlUi [ q j liÞ iff
li
r2in
r2in þ r2sc
lþ r
2
sc
r2in þ r2sc
q þ r
2
in
r2in þ r2sc
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
r2rv
ðq  qÞ:
15 These citations show that the work of women in academia is undervalued in various ways. None of
them focus on editor evaluations, but they support Saul’s claim unless it is assumed that journal editors as
a group are significantly less biased than other academics.
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old-boy network which has excluded minorities, women, younger researchers, and
those from lower-prestige institutions’’.16
I use identity bias to refer to these kinds of biases. I now complicate the model of
Sect. 2 to include identity bias. I then argue that allowing the editor’s decisions to
be influenced by identity bias is unfair to authors, analogous to the argument of the
previous section.
I incorporate identity bias in the model by assuming the editor consistently
undervalues members of one group (and overvalues the others). More precisely, she
believes the average quality of papers produced by any scientist i from the group
she is biased against to be lower than it really is by some constant quantity e.
Conversely, she raises the average quality of papers written by any scientist not
belonging to this group by d.17 So the editor has a different prior for the two groups;
I use pA to denote her prior for the quality of papers written by scientists she is
biased against, and pF for her prior for scientists she is biased in favor of.
As before, the editor may know a given scientist or not. So there are now four
groups. If scientist i is known to the editor and belongs to the stigmatized group the
editor’s prior distribution on the quality of scientist i’s paper is
pAðqi j liÞNðli  e; r2inÞ. If scientist i is known to the editor but is not in the
stigmatized group the prior is pFðqi j liÞNðli þ d; r2inÞ. If scientist i is not known
to the editor and is in the stigmatized group the prior is pAðqiÞNðl e; r2in þ r2scÞ.
And if scientist i is not known to the editor and not in the stigmatized group the
prior is pFðqiÞNðlþ d; r2in þ r2scÞ.18
After the reviewer’s report comes in the editor updates her beliefs about the
quality of the paper. This yields posterior distributions pAðqi j ri; liÞ, pFðqi j ri;liÞ,
pAðqi j riÞ, and pFðqi j riÞ, with posterior means lKAi , lKFi , lUAi , and lUFi , respec-
tively. As before, the paper is published if the posterior mean exceeds the
threshold q. This yields the unsurprising result that the editor is less likely to
publish papers by scientists she is biased against.
16 The latter case is arguably different from the others, as academic affiliation is not as clearly irrelevant
as gender or race: many would argue it is a valid signal of quality. I am inclined to think bias based on
academic affiliation involves epistemic injustice, but I leave arguing this point in detail to future work.
17 This is a simplifying assumption: one could imagine having biases against multiple groups of different
strengths, biases whose strength has some random variation, or biases which intersect in various ways
(Collins and Chepp 2013; Bright et al. 2016). However, the assumption in the main text suffices for my
purposes. It should be fairly straightforward to extend my results to more complicated cases like the ones
just described.
18 Note that I assume that the editor displays bias against scientists in the stigmatized group regardless of
whether she knows them or not. Under a reviewing procedure that is not triple-anonymous, the editor
learns at least the name and affiliation of any scientist who submits a paper. This information is usually
sufficient to determine with reasonable certainty the scientist’s gender. So at least for gender bias it seems
reasonable to expect the editor to display bias even against scientists she does not know. Conversely,
because negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes can work unconsciously, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the editor can withhold her bias from scientists she knows.
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Theorem 4 (Identity Bias) If e[ 0, d[ 0,19 r2sc[ 0, and r
2
rv[ 0, the acceptance
probability for authors the editor is biased against is lower than the acceptance
probability for authors the editor is biased in favor of (keeping fixed whether or not
the editor knows the author). That is,
Pr lKAi [ q
 \ Pr lKFi [ q
  and Pr lUAi [ q
 \ Pr lUFi [ q
 :
Theorem 4 establishes the existence of identity bias in the model: authors that the
editor is biased against are less likely to see their paper accepted than other authors.
Any time a paper is rejected because of identity bias (i.e., the paper would have
been accepted if the relevant part of the author’s identity had been different, all else
being equal), a testimonial injustice occurs.
Testimonial injustices resulting from identity bias can be instances of the central
case of testimonial injustice, in which the credibility deficit results from a negative
identity-prejudicial stereotype. The evidence suggests that negative identity-
prejudicial stereotypes affect the way people (not just men) judge women’s work,
even when one does not consciously believe in these stereotypes. Moreover, those
who think highly of their ability to judge work objectively and/or are primed with
objectivity are affected more rather than less (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007; Stewart
and Payne 2008, p. 1333). Similar claims plausibly hold for biases based on race or
sexual orientation.
So both connection bias and identity bias are responsible for injustices against
authors. This is one way to spell out the claim that it is unfair to authors when
journal editors do not use a triple-anonymous reviewing procedure. This constitutes
the first kind of argument for triple-anonymous reviewing which I mentioned in the
introduction, and which I endorse based on these considerations.
5 The tradeoff between connection bias and identity bias
The second kind of argument I mentioned in the introduction claims that failing to
use triple-anonymous reviewing harms the journal and its readers, because it would
lower the average quality of accepted papers. In Sect. 2 I argued that connection
bias actually has the opposite effect: it increases average quality. Identity bias
complicates the picture, as it generally lowers the average quality of accepted
papers. This raises the question whether the combined effect of connection bias and
identity bias is positive or negative. In this section I show that there is no general
answer to this question.
I compare the average quality of accepted papers under a procedure subject to
connection bias and identity bias to that under a triple-anonymous reviewing
procedure. Under this procedure, the editor’s prior distribution for the quality of any
19 While the assumption that e and d are both positive is sensible given the intended interpretation, it is
not required from a mathematical perspective: eþ d[ 0 suffices for this theorem. See the proof in the
Appendix.
When journal editors play favorites 843
123
submitted paper is pðqiÞNðl; r2in þ r2scÞ, i.e., the prior for unknown authors from
Sect. 2. Hence the posterior is pðqi j riÞ with mean lUi , the probability of acceptance
is PrðlUi [ qÞ and the average quality of accepted papers is E½qi j lUi [ q. As a
result, the editor displays neither connection bias nor identity bias.
In contrast, the double-anonymous reviewing procedure is subject to connection
bias and identity bias. The overall probability that a paper is accepted under this
procedure depends on the relative sizes of the four groups. I use pKA to denote the
fraction of scientists known to the editor that she is biased against, pKF for the
fraction known to the editor that she is biased in favor of, pUA for unknown scientists
biased against, and pUF for unknown scientists biased in favor of
(pKA þ pKF þ pUA þ pUF ¼ 1).
Let Ai denote the event that scientist i’s paper is accepted under the double-
anonymous procedure. The overall probability of acceptance is
Pr Aið Þ ¼ pKA Pr lKAi [ q
 þ pKF Pr lKFi [ q
 
þ pUA Pr lUAi [ q
 þ pUF Pr lUFi [ q
 
;
and the average quality of accepted papers is E½qi j Ai.20
In the remainder of this section I assume that the editor’s biases are such that she
believes the average quality of all submitted papers to be equal to the overall
average l. In other words, her bias against women21 is canceled out on average by
her bias in favor of men, weighted by the relative sizes of those groups:
ðpKA þ pUAÞe ¼ ðpKF þ pUFÞd. Given the other parameter values, this fixes the value
of d. This is a kind of commensurability requirement for the two procedures because
it guarantees that the editor perceives the average quality of submitted papers to
be l regardless of which reviewing procedure is used.
As far as I can tell there are no interesting general conditions on the parameters
that determine whether the double-anonymous procedure or the triple-anonymous
procedure will lead to a higher average quality of accepted papers. The question I
explore next, using some numerical examples, is how biased the editor needs to be
for the epistemic costs of her identity bias to outweigh the epistemic benefits
resulting from connection bias.
In order to generate numerical data values have to be chosen for the parameters.
First I set l ¼ 0 and q ¼ 2 . Since quality is an interval scale in this model, these
choices are arbitrary. For the variances r2in (of the quality of individual papers), r
2
sc
(of the average quality of authors), and r2rv (of the accuracy of the reviewer’s
report), I choose a ‘‘small’’ and a ‘‘large’’ value (1 and 4 respectively).
For the sizes of the four groups, I assume that the percentage of women among
scientists the editor knows is equal to the percentage of women among scientists the
editor does not know. I consider two cases for the editor’s identity bias: either half
20 Expressions for PrðAiÞ and E½qi j Ai using only the parameter values and standard functions are given
in Proposition 14 in the Appendix. These expressions are used to generate the numerical results below.
21 For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this section I assume that the specific form of identity bias
the editor displays is gender bias against women.
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of all authors are women or women are a 30% minority.22 Similarly, I consider the
case in which the editor knows half of all scientists submitting papers, and the case
in which the editor knows 30% of them. As a result, there are 32 possible settings of
the parameters (23 choices for the variances times 22 choices for the group sizes).
It follows from Theorem 2 that when e ¼ 0 the double-anonymous procedure
helps rather than harms the readers of the journal by increasing average quality
relative to the triple-anonymous procedure. If e is positive but relatively small, this
remains true, but when e is relatively big, the double-anonymous procedure harms
the readers. This is because the average quality of published papers under the
double-anonymous procedure decreases continuously as e increases.
The interesting question, then, is where the turning point lies. How big does the
editor’s bias need to be in order for the negative effects of identity bias on quality to
cancel out the positive effects of connection bias?
I determine the value of e for which the average quality of published papers under
the double-anonymous procedure and the triple-anonymous procedure is the same.
Figure 1 reports these numbers. I plot them against the acceptance rate that the
triple-anonymous procedure would have for those values of the parameters. The
bias e is measured in ‘‘quality points’’ (for reference: since l ¼ 0 and q ¼ 2, a
paper needs to be two quality points above average to be accepted).
The variances determine the acceptance rate of the triple-anonymous procedure.
The eight possible settings correspond to six acceptance rates: 0.72, 4.16, 11.51,
16.36, 19.32, and 22.66%. The four different settings for the group sizes are
indicated through the different shapes of the data points in Fig. 1. X’es indicate all
groups are of equal size (pKA ¼ pKF ¼ pUA ¼ pUF ¼ 0:25), circles indicate women
are a minority, pluses indicate authors known to the editor are a minority, and
diamonds indicate both women and known authors are a minority.
Since quality points do not have a clear interpretation outside the context of the
model, I use the values of e shown in Fig. 1 to calculate the average rate of
acceptance of papers authored by women and the average rate of acceptance of
papers authored by men.23 The difference between these numbers gives an
indication of the size of the editor’s bias: it measures (in percentage points,
abbreviated pp) how many more papers the editor accepts from men, compared to
women.
22 Bruner and O’Connor (2017) note that certain dynamics in academic life can lead to identity bias
against groups as a result of the mere fact that they are a minority. Here I consider both the case where
women are a minority (and are possibly stigmatized as a result of being a minority, as Bruner and
O’Connor suggest) and the case where they are not (and so the negative identity-prejudicial stereotype
has some other source).
23 These are calculated without regard for whether the editor knows the author or not. In particular, the
rates of acceptance for women and men are respectively
pKA Pr lKAi [ q
 þ pUA Pr lUAi [ q
 
pKA þ pUA and
pKF Pr lKFi [ q
 þ pUF Pr lUFi [ q
 
pKF þ pUF :
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These differences are reported in Fig. 2. Even with this small sample of 32 cases,
a large variation of results can be observed. I illustrate this by looking at two cases
in detail.
First, suppose that r2in ¼ r2sc ¼ 1 and r2rv ¼ 4, so there is relatively little variation
in the quality of individual papers and in the average quality of authors but
relatively high variation in reviewer estimates of quality. Then the triple-anonymous
procedure has an acceptance rate as low as 0.72%. If the groups are all of equal size
then under the double-anonymous procedure the acceptance rate for men needs to be
as much as 2.66 pp higher than the acceptance rate for women, in order for the
average quality under the two procedures to be equal. Clearly a 2.66 pp bias is very
large for a journal that only accepts less than 1% of papers. If the bias is any less
than that there is no harm to the readers in using the double-anonymous procedure.
Fig. 1 The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs of the double-anonymous
procedure outweigh its benefits (measured in ‘‘quality points’’), in 32 cases, plotted as a function of the
acceptance rate of the corresponding triple-anonymous procedure
Fig. 2 The minimum size of the editor’s bias such that the quality costs of the double-anonymous
procedure outweigh its benefits (given as a percentage point difference in acceptance rates)
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Second, suppose that r2in ¼ r2sc ¼ 4 and r2rv ¼ 1, so the variation in quality of
both papers and authors is relatively high but reviewers’ estimates are relatively
accurate. Then the triple-anonymous procedure has an acceptance rate of 22.66%.
If, moreover, the editor knows relatively few authors then the quality costs of the
double-anonymous procedure outweigh its benefits whenever the acceptance rate
for men is more than 2.23 pp higher than the acceptance rate for women. For a
journal accepting about 23% of papers that means that even if the gender bias of the
editor is relatively mild the journal’s readers are harmed if the double-anonymous
procedure is used.
Based on these results, and the fact that the parameter values are unlikely to be
known in practice, it is unclear whether the double-anonymous procedure or the
triple-anonymous procedure will lead to a higher average quality of published
papers for any particular journal.24 So in general it is not clear that an argument that
the double-anonymous procedure harms the journal’s readers can be made. At the
same time, a general argument that the double-anonymous procedure helps the
readers is not available either. Given this, I am inclined to recommend a triple-
anonymous procedure for all journals because not doing so is unfair to authors.
One might be tempted to draw a different policy recommendation from this
paper: use triple-anonymous review to prevent the negative effects of identity bias
on quality, but provide the editor with the author’s h-index or some other citation
index to benefit from the reduced uncertainty associated with knowing an author’s
average quality. I do not endorse this suggestion for at least two reasons. First, it is
unfair to authors as discussed in Sect. 3. Second, depending on one’s interpretation
of quality, it may be difficult or impossible to infer author quality from citations
(Lindsey 1989; Heesen forthcoming; Bright 2017).
I have argued in this section that the net effect of connection bias and identity
bias on quality is unclear. But I argued in Sect. 2 that the positive effect of
connection bias only exists in certain fields. In fields where papers rely partially on
the author’s testimony there is value in knowing the identity of the author. But in
other fields such as mathematics and parts of the humanities testimony is not taken
to play a role—the paper itself constitutes the contribution to the field—and so
arguably there is no value in knowing the identity of the author.
In those fields, then, there is no quality benefit from connection bias, but there is
still a quality cost from identity bias. So here the strongest case for the triple-
anonymous procedure emerges, as the double-anonymous procedure is both unfair
to authors and harms readers.
I have focused on evaluating triple-anonymous review, in particular in contrast to
double-anonymous review. In many fields, particularly in the natural sciences,
single-anonymous review is the norm, and so the more pertinent question is whether
they should switch to double-anonymous review. Can the present model be used or
adapted to address this question?
24 Note that the evidence collected by Laband and Piette (1994) does not help settle this question, as they
do not directly compare the triple-anonymous and the double-anonymous procedure. Their evidence
supports a positive effect of connection bias, but not a verdict on the overall effect of triple-anonymizing
on quality.
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Analyzing a model in which both the editor and one or more reviewers display
connection bias and/or identity bias is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I only
discuss one relatively simple scenario: the case in which the editor does not display
identity bias but the reviewer does.
Suppose the reviewer is biased against one group, reducing reviewer estimates of
paper quality by e if the author belongs to that group and raising estimates by d
otherwise. If the editor knows the reviewer is biased, she can take the reviewer’s
bias into account. In particular, if she knows which group the reviewer is biased
against and the size of the bias, learning the biased reviewer estimate is equivalent
to learning what the unbiased reviewer estimate would have been, and so a rational
unbiased editor simply updates on the unbiased reviewer estimate. In this case
reviewer bias has no effect on acceptance decisions at all.
If the editor does not know the reviewer is biased, she may (naively) treat the
biased reviewer estimate as an unbiased estimate. In this case the analysis is very
similar to the one given above. A close analogue of Theorem 4 holds. The only
difference is that the effect of the variances is flipped. High values of r2in and r
2
sc
increase the consequences of the reviewer’s bias, while high values of r2rv reduce it.
This is the reverse of what happens in the version of the model I analyzed above
(cf. Proposition 12 in the Appendix).
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have considered two types of arguments for triple-anonymous review:
one based on fairness considerations from the perspective of the author and one
based on the consequences for the readers of the journal.
I have argued that the double-anonymous procedure introduces differential
treatment of scientific authors. In particular, editors are more likely to publish
papers by authors they know (connection bias, Theorem 1) and less likely to publish
papers by authors they apply negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes to (identity
bias, Theorem 4). Whenever a paper is rejected as a result of one of these biases an
epistemic injustice (in the sense of Fricker 2007) is committed against the author.
This is a fairness-based argument in favor of triple-anonymizing.
From the readers’ perspective the story is more mixed, as connection bias has a
positive effect on the quality of published papers and identity bias a negative one.
Whether the readers are better off under the triple-anonymous procedure then
depends on how these effects trade off, which is highly context-dependent. This
yields a more nuanced view than that suggested by either Laband and Piette (1994),
who focus only on connection bias, or by an argument for triple-anonymizing which
focuses only on identity bias.
However, in mathematics and parts of the humanities there is arguably no
positive quality effect from connection bias, as knowing about an author’s other
work is not taken to be relevant (Easwaran 2009). So here the negative effect of
identity bias is the only relevant consideration from the readers’ perspective. In this
situation, considerations concerning fairness for the author and considerations
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concerning the consequences for the readers point in the same direction: in favor of
triple-anonymous review.
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Appendix: Acceptance rates and average quality
The following properties of the normal distribution will be useful (see, e.g., Johnson
et al. 1994, chapter 13, section 3). Let XNðm; s2Þ. Then the moment-generating
function of X is given by
E exp tXf g½  ¼ exp mt þ 1
2
s2t2
 
: ð1Þ
Let Y ¼ aX þ b (with a 6¼ 0). Then
Y N amþ b; a2s2 : ð2Þ
In particular, Xm
s
Nð0; 1Þ has a standard normal distribution, with density func-
tion / and distribution function (or cumulative density function) U.
Proposition 5
p qijrið ÞN lUi ; r2pjr
 
and p qijri; lið ÞN lKi ; r2pjrl
 
;
where
lUi ¼
r2in þ r2sc
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
ri þ r
2
rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
l; r2pjr ¼
1
r2in þ r2sc
þ 1
r2rv
 	1
;
lKi ¼
r2in
r2in þ r2rv
ri þ r
2
rv
r2in þ r2rv
li; r
2
pjrl ¼
1
r2in
þ 1
r2rv
 	1
:
See DeGroot (2004, section 9.5, or any other textbook that covers Bayesian
statistics) for a proof of Proposition 5. Note that r2pjr[ r
2
pjrl whenever r
2
sc[ 0 and
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r2rv[ 0.
Proposition 6 lUi Nðl; r2UÞ and lKi Nðl; r2KÞ , where
r2U ¼
ðr2in þ r2scÞ2
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
and r2K ¼
r4in þ r2scðr2in þ r2rvÞ
r2in þ r2rv
:
Moreover, if r2sc[ 0 and r
2
rv[ 0 , then r
2
U\r
2
K :
Proof Since ri j qiNðqi; r2rvÞ, qi j liNðli; r2inÞ, and liNðl; r2scÞ, it follows
that ri j liNðli; r2in þ r2rvÞ and riNðl; r2in þ r2sc þ r2rvÞ.
Since l is a constant, lUi is a linear transformation of ri. By Eq. 2 l
U
i is normally
distributed with mean l and variance r2U .
For determining the distribution of lKi it is helpful first to define
Xi ¼ lKi  li ¼ r
2
in
r2
in
þr2rv ðri  liÞ. Then Xi j liN 0;
r4in
r2
in
þr2rv
 
by Eq. 2. Now I find the
distribution of lKi by using the moment-generating function and the law of total
expectation.
E½expftlKi g ¼ E½E½expftXi þ tlig j li
¼ E½expftligE½expftXig j li
¼ exp 0t þ 1
2
r4in
r2in þ r2rv
t2
 
E½expftlig
¼ exp lt þ 1
2
r4in þ r2scðr2in þ r2rvÞ
r2in þ r2rv
t2
 
:
This establishes the distribution of lKi . Finally, note that
r2U ¼
ðr2in þ r2scÞ2ðr2in þ r2rvÞ
ðr2in þ r2sc þ r2rvÞðr2in þ r2rvÞ
and r2K ¼
ðr2in þ r2scÞ2ðr2in þ r2rvÞ þ r2scr4rv
ðr2in þ r2sc þ r2rvÞðr2in þ r2rvÞ
:
So r2U\r
2
K whenever r
2
sc[ 0 and r
2
rv[ 0 (and r
2
U ¼ r2K otherwise, assuming either
r2in[ 0 or r
2
rv[ 0). h
Theorem 1 PrðlKi [ qÞ[ PrðlUi [ qÞ if q[ l; r2sc[ 0 , and r2rv[ 0.
Proof It follows from Proposition 6 that
Pr lKi [ q
  ¼ 1 U q
  l
rK
 	
and Pr lUi [ q
  ¼ 1 U q
  l
rU
 	
:
Since U is (strictly) increasing in its argument, and rK [ rU by Proposition 6, the
theorem follows immediately. h
If the editor accepts papers only if her posterior confidence that qi[ q is at least
a (with 1=2 a\1; the main text considers only the case a ¼ 1=2), a similar result
holds. Let za be the number such that UðzaÞ ¼ a.
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Proposition 7 Let r2sc[ 0 and r
2
rv[ 0: If a 1=2 and q þ zarpjr[ l (so the
acceptance rate for unknown scientists is less than 50%), then25
Pr
lKi  q
rpjrl
[ za
 	
[ Pr
lUi  q
rpjr
[ za
 	
:
Proof By Proposition 6, lxi Nðl; r2xÞ both for x ¼ U and x ¼ K. So
Pr
lKi  q
rpjrl
[ za
 	
¼ 1 U zarpjrl þ q
  l
rK
 	
;
Pr
lUi  q
rpjr
[ za
 	
¼ 1 U zarpjr þ q
  l
rU
 	
:
The result follows because za 0, rK [ rU , and rpjr[ rpjrl. h
Proposition 8
E½qi j lUi [ q ¼ E½lUi j lUi [ q and E½qi j lKi [ q ¼ E½lKi j lKi [ q:
Proof Since lUi is simply an (invertible) transformation of ri,
qi j lUi  qi j riN lUi ; r2pjr
 
:
The distribution of qi j lKi is found using the moment-generating function and the
law of total expectation:
E½expftqig j lKi  ¼ E½E½expftqig j li; lKi  j lKi  ¼ E½E½expftqig j li; ri j lKi 
¼ E exp lKi t þ
1
2
r2pjrlt
2
 
j lKi

 
¼ exp lKi t þ
1
2
r2pjrlt
2
 
;
where the second equality follows because, if li is given, l
K
i is simply an invertible
transformation of ri. So:
qi j lKi  qi j ri; liN lKi ; r2pjrl
 
:
Now the law of total expectation can be used to establish (for x ¼ U;K) that
E½qi j lxi [ q ¼ E½E½qi j lxi  j lxi [ q ¼ E½lxi j lxi [ q:
Let XNðm; s2Þ. Then X j X[ a follows a left-truncated normal distribution,
with left-truncation point a. According to, e.g., Johnson et al. (1994, chapter 13,
section 10.1), the mean of this distribution can be expressed as
25 To see that these are the correct acceptance rates, note that a paper by a scientist i unknown to the
editor is accepted if the editor’s posterior satisfies Prðqi[ q j riÞ[ a which is equivalent to 1
Uððq  lUi Þ=rpjrÞ[ a by Proposition 5. This is equivalent to ðlUi  qÞ=rpjr [ za. Analogous reasoning
applies to known scientists.
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E½X j X[ a ¼ mþ sR a m
s
 
: ð3Þ
Here R is defined for all x 2 R by26
RðxÞ ¼ /ðxÞ
1 UðxÞ :
It follows from the definitions that RðxÞ[ 0 for all x 2 R and that
R0ðxÞ ¼ RðxÞ2  xRðxÞ: ð4Þ
Proposition 9 (Gordon 1941) For all x[ 0; RðxÞ\ x2þ1
x
:
Proposition 10 If XNðm; s2Þ and Y Nðm; r2Þ with r[ s[ 0 then
E½Y j Y[ a[ E½X j X[ a:
Proof It suffices to show that the derivative oos E½X j X[ a is positive for all s[ 0.
Differentiating Eq. (3) (using Eq. (4)) yields
o
os
E½X j X[ a ¼ a m
s
 2
þ1
 	
R
a m
s
 
 a m
s
R
a m
s
 2
:
Since Rðam
s
Þ[ 0, oos E½X j X[ a[ 0 if and only if
a m
s
 2
þ1 a m
s
R
a m
s
 
[ 0:
This is true whenever am
s
 0 because then both terms in the sum are positive.
Proposition 9 guarantees that it is true whenever am
s
[ 0. h
Theorem 2 E½qi j lKi [ q[ E½qi j lUi [ q whenever r2sc[ 0; and r2rv[ 0.
Proof By Proposition 8,
E½qi j lUi [ q ¼ E½lUi j lUi [ q and E½qi j lKi [ q ¼ E½lKi j lKi [ q:
By Proposition 6, lUi Nðl; r2UÞ and lKi Nðl; r2KÞ, with rU\rK . Hence the
conditions of Proposition 10 are satisfied, and the result follows. h
Proposition 11
lKi j liN li;
r4in
r2in þ r2rv
 	
;
lUi j liN
r2in þ r2sc
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
li þ
r2rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
l;
ðr2in þ r2scÞ2ðr2in þ r2rvÞ
ðr2in þ r2sc þ r2rvÞ2
 !
:
Proof Since li is given and hence behaves like a constant, both l
K
i and l
U
i are
simply linear transformations of ri, so both results follow from Eq. 2. h
26 R is the inverse of what is known in the literature (e.g., Gordon 1941) as Mills’ ratio.
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Theorem 3 Given r2sc[ 0 and r
2
rv[ 0;
Pr lKi [ q
 j li
  Pr lUi [ q j li
 , li
r2in
r2in þ r2sc
lþ r
2
sc
r2in þ r2sc
q:
Proof Assume r2sc[ 0 and r
2
rv[ 0. Then
27
Pr lKi [ q
 j li
  ¼ 1 U
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r2in þ r2rv
p
r2in
ðq  liÞ
 !
;
Pr lUi [ q
 j li
  ¼ 1 U ðr
2
in þ r2scÞðq  liÞ þ r2rvðq  lÞ
ðr2in þ r2scÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r2in þ r2rv
p
 !
:
So PrðlKi [ q j liÞ PrðlUi [ q j liÞ if and only if
ðr2in þ r2scÞðq  liÞ þ r2rvðq  lÞ
ðr2in þ r2scÞ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r2in þ r2rv
p 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r2in þ r2rv
p
r2in
ðq  liÞ:
Some algebra yields the result. h
Proposition 12
pAðqi j ri; liÞN lKAi ; r2pjrl
 
; pFðqi j ri; liÞN lKFi ; r2pjrl
 
;
pAðqi j riÞN lUAi ; r2pjr
 
; pFðqi j riÞN lUFi ;r2pjr
 
;
where
lKAi ¼ lKi 
e  r2rv
r2in þ r2rv
; lKFi ¼ lKi þ
d  r2rv
r2in þ r2rv
;
lUAi ¼ lUi 
e  r2rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
; lUFi ¼ lUi þ
d  r2rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
:
For a proof I refer once again to DeGroot (2004, section 9.5).
Proposition 13
lKAi N l
e  r2rv
r2in þ r2rv
; r2K
 	
; lKFi N lþ
d  r2rv
r2in þ r2rv
; r2K
 	
;
lUAi N l
e  r2rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
; r2U
 	
; lUFi N lþ
d  r2rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
; r2U
 	
:
27 The expression for PrðlKi [ q j liÞ and the remainder of this proof assume that r2in[ 0. If r2in ¼ 0
then the desired probability is one if li[ q and zero otherwise. Since 0\PrðlUi [ q j liÞ\1, the
result follows.
When journal editors play favorites 853
123
Proof Since lKAi and l
KF
i are simply l
K
i shifted by a constant they follow the same
distribution as lKi except that its mean is shifted by the same constant. Similarly l
UA
i
and lUFi are just l
U
i shifted by a constant. h
For notational convenience, I introduce qKA, qKF , qUA, and qUF , defined by
qKA ¼ q þ e  r
2
rv
r2in þ r2rv
; qKF ¼ q  d  r
2
rv
r2in þ r2rv
;
qUA ¼ q þ e  r
2
rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
; qUF ¼ q  d  r
2
rv
r2in þ r2sc þ r2rv
:
Theorem 4 If eþ d[ 0; r2sc[ 0, and r2rv[ 0;
Pr lKAi [ q
 \ Pr lKFi [ q
  and Pr lUAi [ q
 \ Pr lUFi [ q
 :
Proof For the first inequality, note that
Pr lKAi [ q
  ¼ 1 U q
KA  l
rK
 	
\1 U q
KF  l
rK
 	
¼ Pr lKFi [ q
 
:
The equalities follow from the distributions of the posterior means established in
Proposition 13. The inequality follows from the fact that U is strictly increasing in
its argument. By the same reasoning,
Pr lUAi [ q
  ¼ 1 U q
UA  l
rU
 	
\1 U q
UF  l
rU
 	
¼ Pr lUFi [ q
 
:
Proposition 14
Pr Aið Þ ¼ pKA 1 U q
KA  l
rK
 	 	
þ pKF 1 U q
KF  l
rK
 	 	
þ pUA 1 U q
UA  l
rU
 	 	
þ pUF 1 U q
UF  l
rU
 	 	
:
E qi j Ai½  ¼ lþ rK
Pr Aið Þ pKA/
qKA  l
rK
 	
þ pKF/ q
KF  l
rK
 	 	
þ rU
Pr Aið Þ pUA/
qUA  l
rU
 	
þ pUF/ q
UF  l
rU
 	 	
:
Proof The expression for PrðAiÞ follows immediately from the distributions of the
posterior means established in Proposition 13.
To get an expression for E½qi j Ai, consider first the average quality of scien-
tist i’s paper given that it is accepted and given that scientist i is in the group of
scientists known to the editor that the editor is biased against:
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E qi j lKAi [ q
  ¼ E lKi j lKi [ qKA
  ¼ lþ rKR q
KA  l
rK
 	
;
where the first equality uses the fact that lKAi [ q
 is equivalent to lKi [ q
KA and
then applies Proposition 8, and the second equality uses Eq. 3. Similarly,
E qi j lKFi [ q
  ¼ lþ rKR q
KF  l
rK
 	
;
E qi j lUAi [ q
  ¼ lþ rUR q
UA  l
rU
 	
;
E qi j lUFi [ q
  ¼ lþ rUR q
UF  l
rU
 	
:
The average quality of accepted papers E½qi j Ai is a weighted sum of these
expectations. The weights are given by the proportion of accepted papers that are
written by a scientist in that particular group. For example, authors known to the
editor that she is biased against form a pKA PrðlKAi [ qÞ= PrðAiÞ proportion of
accepted papers. Hence
E qi j Ai½  ¼ 1
Pr Aið Þ pKA Pr l
KA
i [ q
 E qi j lKAi [ q
 
þ 1
Pr Aið Þ pKF Pr l
KF
i [ q
 E qi j lKFi [ q
 
þ 1
Pr Aið Þ pUA Pr l
UA
i [ q
 E qi j lUAi [ q
 
þ 1
Pr Aið Þ pUF Pr l
UF
i [ q
 E qi j lUFi [ q
 
¼ lþ rK
Pr Aið Þ pKA/
qKA  l
rK
 	
þ pKF/ q
KF  l
rK
 	 	
þ rU
Pr Aið Þ pUA/
qUA  l
rU
 	
þ pUF/ q
UF  l
rU
 	 	
:
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